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Export-oriented industrialization has been regarded by many 
economists as an efficient way to attain economic growth for 
developing countries. The Newly Industrialized Countries (MCs) of 
Asia, i.e. South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, have 
often been quoted as such successful cases. Detailed investigations 
by some economists have revealed, however, different geo-political 
and historical factors behind each of them and cautioned against 
possible pitfalls of over-generalization that aims to propagate 
export-oriented industrialization as a panacea for lack of growth in 
the developing economies. James Petras has found that export- 
oriented industrialization generally leads to overconcentration of 
light manufacturing.' Of 48 countries analysed, he found only seven 
that derived 30% or more of their manufacture value-added from 
industrial branches other than light industries. All seven, except 
India, are countries of 'middle income', suggesting that the 
deepening of industrialization is at least in part a product of the 
growing internal market. These countries are India, Kenya, Mexico, 
Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, and Singapore. The last country, 
Singapore, achieved such a rank mainly due to its refineries, ship- 
building and processing for tin and rubber which was a conse- 
quence of its location in Southeast Asia. The small internal market 
of countries such as Macau and Hong Kong has precluded them 
from the development of heavy industries. 
Macau is one of those developing countries which have registered 
a rapid pace of economic development through export-oriented 
industrialization in the last two decades. However, Macau is little 
known, except for its world-class casinos, because of the small size 
of its economy and the general lack of published materials about it. 
Yet Macau shows some distinct character. Its industrial growth has 
been the outcome of its geo-political situation and its relationship 
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with Hong Kong. Dired investment from the latter has played a 
large role in spearheading and shaping Macau's manufacturing, to 
the extent that Macau functions more or less as an extraterritorial 
outprocessing appendage of Hong Kong. 
The present paper wants to fill the existing gap of information by 
piecing relevant fads together for a more complete, though largely 
descriptive, presentation of the modern export-oriented indu- 
strialization of Macau. First, it traces the evolution of the Macau 
economy, then the industrialization process in 1958-1986, and finally 
it discusses the major dynamics and characteristics of the process. 
Hopefully, it will improve our understanding of the varying fadors 
behind the success of export-oriented industrialization in economic 
development in developing countries and add further substance to 
debates on economic development strategies for these economies. 
In the presentation, developments in Macau have often been 
compared to those of Hong Kong. This is mainly because they are 
geographically adjacent and closely integrated economically, 
especially in manufacturing development. Of course Macau is much 
smaller than Hong Kong and in many respects dominated by it. 
Available data show that the GDP of Macau in 1986 was about 1 
billion US dollars, compared to Hong Kong's 37.9 billion US dollars 
for the same year. As will be shown later, Macau not only takes 
lead from Hong Kong, it is very much overshadowed by it. Its 
industrialization is highly dependent on the excellent port of Hong 
Kong, its well developed financial and communication facilities as 
well as Hong Kong's capital, technology and entrepreneurial skills. 
The success of Macau's industrialization lies very much with its 
complementary role to Hong Kong deriving from its geo-political 
situation and close proximity to it. Therefore, on one hand, Macau 
industries share, to a large extent, the characteristics of Hong Kong 
industries, being labour-intensive, highly concentrated in textiles, 
garment and plastic goods, and small-scale in operation. On the 
other hand, dependence on Hong Kong has led to obvious defects 
in the Macau system such as insufficient demand for skill training, 
lack of innovativeness, inadequate development of supporting 
industries and a general short term view on future prospects. 
Like Hong Kong, Macau has entered into a political transitional 
period. The Portuguese will return the administration of Macau to 
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the local people in 1999 under an agreement with China signed in 
1987. In the conclusion of the paper, the possible change in Macau's 
manufacturing arising from such change in political status will also 
be briefly discussed. In the light of such impending changes, a 
comprehensive review of its post Second World War industrial 
development should also be of practical planning merits. 
Evolution of Macau's Modem Economy 
Macau is a small Portuguese administered territory located at the 
western flank of the Pearl River Delta in South China. It has a total 
area of 16 km2 and a population of about 450,000. To its east, about 
64 km away and just about one hour jetfoil journey, on the eastern 
flank of the Pearl River Delta lies Hong Kong, a much 'larger' place 
with about 1,070 km2 territory and 5.6 million population. 
Macau was obtained from the hands of corrupt Mandarins by 
Portugal in 1557 and since then served Portugal as a religious and 
trading outpost in the Far East till the Second World War.' Its 
'informal' political status ended in 1987, when the Chinese and 
Portuguese governments signed the Joint Declaration to transfer 
Macau's sovereignty back to China in 1999. The Joint Declaration 
promised preservation in Macau of the existing social, economic and 
legal systems as well as a high degree of self-rule for 50 years after 
1999. Macau would become a Special Administrative Area of 
China, the same status Hong Kong will enjoy after 1997. 
Immediately after the Portuguese occupation in 1557, Macau 
prospered as a thriving international trade centre and Portuguese 
religous outpost for roughly 80-90 years.3 However, declining 
Portuguese influence and conflicts between Portugal and Spain 
caused major disruptions that ended the first epoch of prosperity in 
Macau. Macau enjoyed a second period of trade-derived prosperity 
again from 1717, when the Qing government in China closed all 
Chinese ports to foreign trade.4 This second epoch of prosperity 
was, however, terminated by the rising British influence in China 
since the turn of the 18th century and the establishment of Hong 
Kong in 1842. The shallow water in the port of Macau proved less 
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attractive than the much wider and deeper Victoria Harbour of 
Hong Kong to the new generation of ocean ships powered by steam 
engines. Hence, Macau became almost a pond of dead water 
overtaken by Hong Kong, the new China entrep6t and other new 
treaty ports along the China coast, and was gradually phased out 
as a member of significance in the international trade of the Far 
East. 
Declining Portuguese influence in this part of the world and the 
rise of Hong Kong in its proximity only partly explained Macau's 
downfall as a major international trading centre. Its natural 
handicaps - the small size of the territory and the lack of a good 
natural harbour, as well as deficient modern facilities - were more 
important factors. Loss of the traditional trading role forced Macau 
to develop new means of survival, the so-called "special industries", 
i.e. gambling, prostitution, opium trade, and gold smuggling, taking 
advantage of its geographical location and special administrative 
status (The Chinese government forbade gambling and the Hong 
Kong government did the same except for horse racing and lottery). 
Gambling was, however, the more important of these as a means of 
public revenue. In the reign of Governor Isidora Francises Guima- 
riaes (1851-63), in order to secure enough revenue in Macau, a 
licensing system for gambling houses was introduced. Then only 
Chinese games were al10wed.~ 
Table I .  Composition of Macau's Export, 1930-1986 (in percent) 
1930 1958 1969 1982 1986 
Fish 
Fire-crackers 
Matches 
Incense 
Textiles & 
garment 
Food 
Artific. flower 
Toys 
Electronics 
Others 
5.3 19.0 
18.3 9.9 
N. A. N.A. 
N. A. N.A. 
N.A. N. A. 
12.0 9.8 
9.2 1.1 
N.A. N.A. 
7.1 N.A. 
N.A. N.A. 
71.6 76.8 
N.A. N.A. 
N.A. 3.6 
N. A. 7.8 
N.A. 2.8 
12.0 7.9 
0.7 
N. A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
69.7 
N.A. 
2.8 
11.8 
4.1 
10.9 
Source: Quarterly Economic Bulletin (March 1987). 
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In 1934, Macau granted gambling monopoly to the Tai Xing Co. 
I leading the further development of gambling in Macau. Throughout 
the 1930s, government tax from gambling activities yielded an 
I 
annual revenue of about 1.5 million patacas, whereas the annual 
I export amounted to about 10 million patacas. Among the exports in 
the 1930s (see Table 1) manufactured goods from three traditional 
I crafts figured quite importantly. They were the making of matches, 
fire-crackers, and incense, all industries taking advantage of 
I Macau's cheap labour, low import tax of the major raw materials 
I 
I 
required and tariff preferences granted by the USA. Indeed, these 
I handicrafts had pioneered Macau's industrialization and remained 
1 the dominant export sectors well into the 1950s (see Table 1). In 
1958, they together with fish products accounted for 61.3% of the 
total exports. Their employment took 90% of the total 
manufacturing employment of 17,685 workers as revealed by an 
industrial suwey in 1957.6 
Macau's economy experienced a significant turn in the early 
1950s. In 1952, the USA, the largest market for fire-crackers and 
incense, banned its import from Macau as part of its embargo on 
trade with China following the Korean War. In 1957, a new 
Portuguese legislation (Decree No. 41026) opened Portuguese 
territories and colonies to Macau exports with tax free treat~nent.~ 
Then, in 1961, a new law in Portugal decreed Macau as a "tourist 
city" and allowed it to operate western gambling? This train of 
events set Macau on a new course of development which laid the 
foundation of its present modern economy. 
Thus, in 1962, the gambling business was reorganized. Added on 
top of the traditionally tolerated Chinese games was a full range of 
western casino games, and gambling was largely re-enfranchised 
and integrated with tourist devel~prnent.~ The monopoly position 
and security offered by the new arrangement enabled Macau to 
attract investors with large capital resources. The monopoly has 
since been won by the Sociedade de Turismo e Diversoes de Macau 
(STDM) a largely Hong Kong owned enterprise. Through its efforts 
Macau has developed a new image as "The Monte Carlo of the 
Orient" serving a wide geographical area in the Far East where 
gambling is generally restricted, especially its crowded neighbour 
Hong Kong which became its main source of customers. As part of 
Victor F.S. Sit 
franchise conditions, STDM helped Macau develop its basic urban 
infrastructure, such as electricity, port facilities, external transport 
and communication with Hong Kong, and finance tourism and in- 
dustrial export promotion offices and efforts. Gambling also 
provides Macau the largest source of the government's current 
revenue (46.4% in the first half of 1986).1° Together with tourism, 
gambling contributed 25% of the GDP in 1985 (see Table 2). Hence 
modernization of the gambling sedor has not only generated much 
government revenue and local employment and sparked off the 
complementary development of tourism, but also helped to improve 
the territory's physical and social infrastructure and its trahsport 
links with Hong Kong, making Macau more attractive to export- 
oriented industries, particularly to investors from Hong Kong 
seeking cheap labour, cheap space and new export quotas. 
Table 2. Origin of Macads GDP, 1985 
Manufacturing 
Tourism, incl. gambling 
Construction 
Trade 
Finance 
Civil service 
Energy 
Fishery 
Other 
Source: Economic Intelligence Unit estimates, U.K. (1987) 
The 1952 Decree which enabled Macau goods to have free entry 
into Portugal and its overseas colonies led to a major qualitative 
change in its manufacturing, which at present is the most significant 
sedor of the economy. Manufacturing in 1986 provided close to half 
of the local jobs and generated 40% of the GDP whilst 90% of its 
output by value is exported, forming the largest foreign exchange 
earner as well. " 
The economy as indicated in Table 2, shows a heavy dependence 
on export-oriented manufacturing. The shadowy "special industries" 
of the early decades of the century, with the exception of gambling, 
have largely been phased out of significance. Even gambling is 
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presently qualitatively different from what it was and is closely 
integrated with tourism which puts emphasis on recreation and 
sightseeing. 
Industrialization in Macau 
As Table 1 shows, the qualitative changes involved in Macau's in- 
dustrialization can be divided into four phases: 1) early indu- 
strialization, 2) Portugal-led transformation, 3) phase of textiles and 
garments, 4) phase of diversification. 
Early Industrialization 
As has been said in the previous section, early industrialization of 
Macau was largely sparked off by the loss of Macau's trading role 
to Hong Kong and hence the need to find employment for the local 
population, which had increased to about 270,000 at around 1930, 
largely due to immigration caused by internal troubles inside China. 
This early phase of industrialization was founded mainly on cheap 
labour and low taxation on raw materials for fire-crackers and 
matches. At the time these handicrafts possibly formed the second 
largest employment sector, as about 60,000 persons were registered 
as belonging to the fishing population, likely to be the dominant 
employment sector.'' 
Portugal-led Transformation 
The growth of modern industries was mainly due to Macau's loss 
of the USA market for its traditional handicraft products and new 
opportunities arising from the free movement of goods into 
Portuguese territories and colonies. The latter attracted many 
entrepreneurial Hong Kong businessmen as well as local industria- 
lists to launch a new phase of industrial growth by setting up 
factories for production of light manufactured consumer goods for 
the Portuguese colonies and Portugal itself. The factories made use 
of the local cheap labour to produce textiles and wigs. At the height 
of this phase of industrialization, Portugal and its colonies became 
Macau's major export markets and took 56.7% of its total exports. 
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Textiles contributed 19% of the total export, and the three traditio- 
nal crafts still maintained a substantial share (28.5%, see Table 1). 
However fish products, which are largely non-manufactured, still 
accounted for the largest share of the total export. The Portugal 
factor was truncated in the second half of the 1960s when Macau's 
'duty free' privileges to enter Portugal and the Portuguese colonies 
were withdrawn. 
Phase of Textiles and Garments 
The major thrust in the development of modern manufacturing was 
steered by Hong Kong industrialists who under pressure of 
increasing restriction by European countries on their textile exports 
since the early 1960s sought to set up production facilities in Macau 
which was not yet under such restriction. Direct investment of this 
sort by Hong Kong industrialists at the time in other parts of the 
world, particularly in Taiwan and Southeast Asia has been treated 
by various authors, though there is little mention of Macau.13 The 
UK was the first country to impose trade restrictions on Hong 
Kong. Then came the EEC and USA, all in the early 1960s, and the 
restrictions largely applied to cotton textile products. Hence the 
growth rate of textiles in the 1960s in Macau was as high as 50% 
per annum. In 1969 and 1972-73, additional countries like Sweden 
and Canada followed suit. In 1972-75 trade restridions on Hong 
Kong was furthermore extended to man-made fibres, woollen 
knitting, and knitted garments. A second wave of external stimuli 
came in 1976 when the USA introduced the General Preference 
Scheme (GPS) granting preferential tariff for selected products from 
developing countries. The new practice was soon taken up by the 
EEC, Canada and other developed countries. Hong Kong and 
Macau were among the 136 beneficiary countries of the scheme, yet 
important products such as garments and most electronic goods 
were excluded from Hong Kong. Investing in Macau therefore 
became a viable means for Hong Kong manufacturers for circum- 
venting Hong Kong's exclusion. 
The engine of growth for manufacturing in the second half of the 
1960s and the 1970s was therefore apparently textiles and garments 
whose combined share of Macau's total export soared from 58.2% 
in 1970 to the all time high of about 90% in 1979.14 Fuelled by 
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textiles and garments, manufacturing in Macau experienced an 
unprecedented annual growth rate of 27% with an overall increase 
of total exports of 29-fold in the period. The destination of exports 
changed accordingly. The EEC rose to a predominant position in 
1975-80, accounting for 50%-60% of total exports by value. 
Phase of Diversification 
In the 1980s, Macau's manufacturing sector sought to diversify 
under new exogeneous factors. Overconcentration on textiles and 
garments proved dangerous as Macau was soon put under 
restraining measures by its major overseas markets. The latest round 
(1982) of such restraining agreements straight-jacketed the annual 
growth of textile products to no more than 6%. Secondly, another 
wave of growth due to the transfer of industrial capacity from Hong 
Kong happened since 1979, when industrialists there found that 
their advantages in a range of exports of manufactured goods e.g. 
toys and artificial flowers, under the GPS were being reduced or 
withdrawn (for toys the withdrawal came in 1981). Having learned 
from previous experience of the textiles and garments quota 
restrictions, many such industrialists closed their production 
facilities in Hong Kong and re-installed them in Macau where the 
GPS advantage for these products still existed.I5 These newly 
arrived export sectors in Macau, composed of toys, artificial flowers, 
electronics and leather articles, made up 31% of the total export in 
1985, a sharp rise from Macau's less than 1% in 1977. The most 
spectacular example is artificial flowers; this produdion was started 
in Macau in 1979, and its export growth in the three years that 
followed were respectively 40076, 200% and 100%. However, in 
1986, an upsurge of textiles and garments temporarily reduced the 
share of the new sectors to about 20% (see Table 1). The com- 
position of the export markets duely reflected the above changes, 
with increasing eminence of the USA to reach near parity with the 
EEC 
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Dynamics of Industrial Growth 
The free trade policy and the dire situation of lack of resources and 
employment alternatives other than the gambling business have 
been obvious factors driving Macau towards establishing export- 
oriented manufacturing, taking advantage of its proximity to Hong 
Kong and its own special political and administrative status that 
had repeatedly won it separate quotas and special tariff treatment 
in the world's major markets for light industrial products. Feitor, in 
his work on Macau's modern economy, listed five major factors for 
the growth of Macau's modern economy, all of which are relevant 
to the development and expansion of manufacturing: 
Favourable geographical location, especially the proximity to 
Hong Kong, enabling the benefit of spill-over effects of its 
development, and to Mainland China, providing a cheap 
source of food and other necessities and raw materials. 
Liberal economic system, with limited government interven- 
tion and very low tax burden. 
Existence of a nucleus of dynamic entrepreneurs with a 
positive attitude towards risk-assumption and a reasonable 
knowledge of the export markets. 
High elasticity of labour supply, which has allowed wage 
levels to be kept comparatively low, coupled with the relati- 
vely high quality of labour for jobs not very demanding in 
skills. 
Comparatively favourable access to foreign markets,16 
Feitor's five factors require careful scrutiny. For example factors 1 
and 5 would only be meaningful when interpreted in terms of 
Macau's separate quota and favourable tariff treatment by some 
overseas markets and its proximity to Hong Kong. The last fact is 
important for the translation of such advantages into development 
of export-oriented manufacturing. This is because Macau possesses 
neither an airport nor an international harbour, prime requirements 
for export-oriented industrial development for a small territory with 
no raw material resource. Indeed, geographically, Macau is much 
handicapped by its poor harbour and perennial silting problem, its 
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1 location off the tracks of international shipping and its lack of 
railway link with south China. Most of Macau's trade has to go 
through Hong Kong thus adding to the time and money costs due 
to the transshipment involved. 
Direct foreign investment from Hong Kong is believed to account 
for at least 60% of the industrial activities of Macau, though up until 
now no exact figures on such has been available.'' In a survey done 
in 1982 on 32 Hong Kong industrial firms that had invested in 
manufacturing in other Asian countries (not including Macau), 
Chen found that the two top motivations for deciding to invest 
overseas by Hong Kong firms are 'shortage of labour supply in 
Hong Kong' and 'high labour costs in Hong Kong' while 'to 
facilitate the export of produds to third-part countries' closely 
followed as a third factor.'' Although Chen did not clearly define 
the third motivation, it may be reasonably taken as quota or tariff 
attraction of the host country for exporting the finished product. 
Indeed, Chen did list out 'to circumvent tariffs and quotas imposed 
by developed countries' as an eighth motivation which scored about 
half the frequencies (or sigruiicance) as any of the first three 
motivations. Direct foreign investment in Macau by Hong Kong 
industrialists seems to follow quite closely this overall pattern of 
motivations of Hong Kong multinationals to invest overseas. It is a 
pity that Macau mostly has not been included in such inves- 
tigations. Due to Macau's proximity to Hong Kong, the volume and 
intensity of direct Hong Kong investment should be the most 
important fador behind Macau's industrial development as has 
been generally admitted. However, other than the time correlations 
between incidences of imposition of new quotas, tariff or trade 
restraint measures on Hong Kong exports and the rapid growth of 
the same type of industrial export in Macau, there is a lack of 
precise and direct quantitative information on the amount and 
nature of direct foreign investment by Hong Kong businessmen in 
Macau manufacturing, except the '60%' figure quoted in this 
paragraph earlier on. In two recent surveys of factories in Macau 
organized in the summer of 1987 for unravelling the business 
characteristics of Macau industries, some indirect evidence on the 
extent of foreign ownership of Macau industries have been found.lg 
Out of 100 cases of successful interviews of factories employing 1- 
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100 workers, 4 were owned by Hong Kong bosses. The same survey 
also contacted 84 other small establishments whose owners were 
reported by interviewees as pernianent residents of Hong Kong and 
were not available for interview. Based on these, it may be guessed 
that 25-36% of the small factories are owned by Hong Kong 
residents. The second survey had contacted 25 medium to large 
factories, of which 14 (or 56%) were owned by Hong Kong based 
interests. It may indicate that the large factories are most likely to 
be owned by Hong Kong interests. The validity of Feitor's third 
factor, the existence of a dynamic entrepreneurial class in Macau, is 
therefore much open to doubt. 
Thus among Feitor's factors, the more important is number 5 - 
favourable access to foreign markets 'compared' to Hong Kong. In 
textiles and garments, Hong Kong enjoys the largest share of import 
quotas in North American and EEC markets. Despite this, the 
quotas do constrain the pace of growth in these industries. Macau's 
quotas in such markets, though much smaller in size compared to 
Hong Kong's, are nevertheless adequate incentives for some of 
Hong Kong's operators in these industries to expand production in 
Macau or set: up subcontracting linkages there (as have been 
revealed in the Hong Kong report on SMI development) as well as 
raison d'ttre for Macau entrepreneurs to venture into export 
manufacturing, copying the example of their Hong Kong counter- 
parts. At present two thirds of the exports of Macau's dominant 
textiles and garments sectors are under restraining measures of the 
quota system, This is to say that about 45% of manufacturing 
exports of Macau are 'quota exports', indicating the significance of 
Macau's share of quotas in its drive in ind~strialization.~' Attraction 
of the GPS, adopted by the various industrialized nations since 1976 
likewise played a significant role to garments and the other new 
industries as previously mentioned. In total, exports under the GPS 
system amounted to 13.2% of total exports (available figure at 1982, 
see Table 3). It included 95.2% of the toy production, 85.5% of the 
artificial flowers and more than half of furniture and optical 
instruments. To a large extent, development and growth of these 
industries were related to the existence of the GPS system. Of the 
industrialized countries which adopted the system the majority have 
already renewed its validity until 1990. The system will therefore 
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continue to be a significant factor of growth for Macau exports, 
especially so when the most important of the GPS granting 
countries, the USA has withdrawn in January 1988 its preferential 
treatment altogether under the GPS from the four Asian NICs 
i (Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong) all keen com- 
I petitors of Macau exports. 
Table 3. Macau's Exports under the GPS System of Preferences 
Items Total amount Percent of Percent of 
(million p.)" Total exp. GPS exp. 
Textiles and garments 116 8.4 19.6 
Artificial flowers 115 85.5 19.5 
Ceramics 7 20.2 1 .2 
Electronics - 
Furniture 12 56.5 2.1 
Toys 266 95.2 45.1 
Optical instruments 19 59.8 3.3 
Others 55 12.9 9.2 
Total 591 13.2 100.0 
Source: Government of Macau, Sectorial Policies, Investment Plans (Public Sector) 1984 
(Macau, 1984), p. 98. 
" p. = patacas. Eight patacas is about one US dollar. 
Of course, high fador costs of land and labour in Hong Kong add 
to the steepness of the attraction gradient which pulled some 
manufacturing industries away from Hong Kong into Macau. 
Labour cost in Macau is estimated to be 40% less than in Hong 
Kong, while land and factory rental are reportedly 30% lower.'l 
Corporate profit tax in Macau is 15%, lower than the 16.5% charged 
in Hong Kong. Yet the edge of real cost saving is slim, as there are 
additional costs involved in operating in Macau, such as transpor- 
tation of raw materials, parts and components, and finished 
produds between Macau and Hong Kong, higher communication 
costs (long distance telephone calls), an extra charge of 1.2% FOB 
value for certificate of origin for produds exported under the quota 
system, higher electricity costs and much more bureaucracy than in 
Hong Kong. 
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In more recent years, it had been the supply of labour (in 
addition to its lower cost) that had sustained Macau as an attractive 
location for some Hong Kong industrial firms, due largely to 
immigration from the PRC. However, as an industrial centre, Macau 
suffers from lack of skilled labour, insufficient number of indigen- 
ous entrepreneurs and inadequate industrial support services. At 
present, the majority of factories in Macau are believed to be owned 
and operated by Hong Kong entrepreneurs, with their management 
and technical supervisors brought in from Hong Kong. Up-grading 
training at the operative level is equally deficient, rendering a low 
rate of growth in labour productivity, i.e. annually at 2% in 1979-82, 
compared to 6% in 1980-86 in Hong Kong.'' Such poor achieve- 
ments are obviously both the consequence of the small size and 
hence the lack of scale economies for the provision of support 
services, lack of 'effective demand' as such needs may be more 
easily fulfilled by 'imports' from Hong Kong, as well as a govern- 
ment lukewarm in the promotion of manufacturing. 
Characteristics of Macau Manufacturing 
The demand side characteristics of Macau manufacturing have been 
previously revealed. Export-orientation, the concentration of 
demand in a few advanced economies as well as fluctuations in 
terms of product and market groups in time sequence and the 
relationship between these and Hong Kong investment have been 
discussed in some details. Within Macau itself, manufacturing at 
present is heavily dominated by garments and textiles (Table 4). 
According to the latest Industrial Survey (1984) available, garments 
accounted for 48.6% of manufacturing employment, 48.1% of gross 
output, and 44.9% of value-added in manufacturing. It was followed 
by a much smaller textiles sector which accounted for 15% of 
employment, 21.6% of gross-output, and 18.8% of value-added in 
manufacturing. These two industries therefore dominated manufac- 
turing in Macau. 
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I Table 4. Industrial Production Statistics of Macau, 1984 
Industry ISIC Units Employ- Gross Value- Wage Material 
No. ment Output added bill consumption 
(no.) persons) (1,000 p.)" (1,000 p.) (1,000 p.) (1,000 p.) 
Textiles 321 124 8,825 126,949 325,986 143,922 939,508 
Garment 323 410 28,693 2,820,332 777,898 406,259 2,042,434 
I Footwear 323.4 28 1,695 131,677 54,968 28,023 76,708 Wood & cork 331 35 248 12,186 6,523 2,992 5,663 
I Furniture 332 46 783 42,086 18,803 12,512 23,283 Paper & 341 34 476 57,130 14,996 7,321 42,134 
I paper prod. Printing & 342 51 910 47,803 22,018 16,522 25,784 
! publishing Plastics 356 56 4,999 452,039 162,576 76,667 289,463 
Pottery 361.2 20 656 46,358 25,207 13,000 21,150 
glass 
Fabricated 381 78 2,224 219,659 79,367 34,835 140,292 
metal 
Electrical & 383 30 2,217 160,374 34,871 27,119 125,503 
electronics 
Transp. eq. 384 32 510 36,187 17,251 14,027 18,936 
Precision & 785 10 938 61,898 24,393 13,619 37,505 
scient. eq. 
Others 213 5,836 508,287 167,168 82,636 345,124 
All manufact. 1167 59,001 5865511 1732025 879454 4133487 
Source: Compiled from Recensearnento Industrial 1984 (Census of Industry, 1984) (Macau: 
Macau Government). 
" p. = patacas. Eight patacas is about one US dollar. 
In the 1984 Industrial Census, 410 garment factories were re- 
ported, though it is believed that there are hundreds of small family 
workshops that might have been excluded from the Cens~s.'~ About 
80% of the garment output was exported to markets covered by the 
Multi-Fibre Agreements. The textiles sector is largely composed of 
small woollen knitters which numbered about 100; 60-70% of the 
output from them are exported to markets with quota arrangements 
(69.2% in 1984 and 64.2% in 1985).x However, the largest woollen 
knitter alone employed about 3,000 workers. Other textile factories 
are few in numbers. There were five woollen spinning mills in 1984, 
with about 2,000-3,000 employees; one silk-weaver with 250 
employees; one cotton-weaver; two textile finishing factories; and 
about 15 stenciling factories. The paucity of supporting textile 
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industries reflects the lack of economies of scale as market demand 
for their products or processes in Macau is small. Most of the 
supporting processes are therefore done in Hong Kong, leaving 
Macau highly concentrated in final processing for the finished 
goods. 
Plastics form the third largest industry, It accounted for 8.5% of 
the employment, 7.7% of gross output and 9.4% of value-added in 
manufacturing in 1984. Toys are the main products of the plastics 
sector. Its growth was spurred by the withdrawal in 1981 of GPS 
treatment on Hong Kong exports by a number of countries, 
including Hong Kong's major markets, the USA and UK. At present 
about half of the toy export of Macau goes to the USA market.25 
The fourth industry is electrical and electronics which accounted 
for 3.8% of employment, 2.7% of gross output and 2% of value- 
added in manufacturing. The first electronics factory was es- 
tablished in the early 1970s and the industry's impetus of growth 
came since the late 1970s. In 1983 France forced an import restraint 
on Hong Kong exports of electronic watches which gave further 
stimulus to the development of the industry in Macau. At present 
90% of the industrfs output by value are composed of radio and 
cassette recorders, out of which 67.4% (in 1985) were exported to 
France where Macau enjoys no export restraint for these categories 
of goods.26 
Other industries in Table 4 made up a minor part of the industrial 
system in Macau, in terms of employment, output and value-added. 
When the statistics of the 1984 Censeamento Industrial are analysed 
further (Table 5), additional characteristics of Macau's manufac- 
turing can be observed. 
First, the size of the establishment is larger than the comparable 
figure in Hong Kong, This may be due to the fact that many of the 
smaller establishments (i.e. household factories of less than 5 
persons) have not been included in the Census. Or it may be due to 
the lack of a widely developed subcontracting and supporting 
network of smaller firms in Macau as factory operations there seem 
more inclined toward labour-intensive type of final processing (e.g. 
comparable average establishment size for textiles, garments, 
plastics and electronics in Hong Kong in 1986 are respectively 23, 
29,16,69 persons). This has been confirmed by the surveys done in 
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1987. In the Macau sample of 100 small and medium scale factories, 
only 16 were found to receive subcontracts from other factories, 
while in a Hong Kong sample of 292 similar size factories 29.4% are 
~ubcontractors.~~ 
Table 5. Characteristics and Cost Structure of Selected Industries, 1984 
Textiles Average 
employment 
(persons) 
Textiles 71.2 
Garments 70.0 
Plastics 89.3 
Fabr. metals 28.5 
Electrical & 73.9 
electronics 
Gross output 
per person 
(employed) 
Census 
value-added 
(% of G.O.)" 
Cost consumption 
( I  of gross output) 
Labour Consumption Rental, depre- 
cost ciation, profit 
" Census value-added = gross output less consunption. 
Includes raw materials, water electricity, fuel, maintenance, and industrial services. 
Bracket fugures are comparable f i v  in Hong Kong manufacturing for 1985. 
Source: Recenseamento Industrial 1984 (Census of Industry, 1984) (Macau: Macau Government). 
Secondly, the value-added of Macau manufacturing as a per- 
centage of gross output was 29.5%, substantially lower than Hong 
Kong (37.7%), indicating that Macau has more assembling industries 
where the larger local input is labour of lower skill-level. The cost 
composition of the selected industries and that of the whole manu- 
facturing sector have been worked out as a percentage of gross out- 
put. However, no separate information on rental and depreciation 
was recorded in the Census, so these are lumped together with 
profit as a residual category (Table 5). The bulk of costs was 
accounted for by consumption of materials, water, fuels, electricity 
and industrial services. The percentages regstered by all Macau 
industries underneath this column in the table were sigruficantly 
higher than those registered in Hong Kong. Additional transfer cost 
from Hong Kong where most of these materials were initially im- 
ported or made, plus higher electricity and water rates may be the 
reasons behind. However, Macau was compensated to a great extent 
by much lower labour costs, especially so for the predominant 
gannents and textiles industries. Labour costs as a percentage of 
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gross output were quite close between Macau and Hong Kong for 
plastics and electrical and electronics. Comparative scarcity of local 
supporting industries for making parts and components as well as 
processing services are major reasons behmd the overall lower 
percentages in value-added, particularly so in garments and 
eledrical and electronics. In Hong Kong where data on 'rents and 
rates for land and buildings', 'rentals for hiring machinery and 
equipment' and 'other operating expenses' are available in the 
aggregate figure "other expenses", we can estimate the amount of 
depreciation and profit as percentage of gross output. For the entire 
manufacturing and the selected industries, these were (in 1985): all 
manufacturing 8%; garments 4.1%; textiles 7.9%; plastics 11.0%; 
fabricated metals 10.1% and electronical and electronics 13.1%. With 
the large residual percentages, in electronical and electronics, the 
possibility of sizeable spending on depreciation in these industries 
is highly feasible. Thus we may infer that the electronics industry 
in Macau, when compared with Hong Kong, appears to belong to 
a lower level in technological scale as evidenced by its cost 
composition. 
The above characteristics are supported by a much lower value 
in average gross output per employed person in Macau factories 
(Table 5). For manufacturing as a whole Macau was roughly 50% of 
Hong Kong, and was much lower for electrical and electronics. Of 
course, lower percentage of value-added, higher costs of con- 
sumption of materials and other non-labour inputs and lower per 
capita gross output all reflect that Macau industries belong to a 
lower skill level, and are of cheap labour assembling or simple 
processing types of activities. Macau, as previous paragraphs have 
illustrated, survives to a large extent as an adjunct to the Hong 
Kong industrial system. Like other Kong Kong direct overseas 
investments in manufacturing, most Hong Kong owned operations 
exploit the labour factor of the host country, and hence the logical 
tendency of Macau manufacturing to be even more biased towards 
low technology, labour intensive assembling activities than Hong 
Kong. As Macau is about 1110th Hong Kong's size in terms of total 
manufacturing employment and 1130th in value of manufacturing 
gross output, factors of small size and geographical proximity 
render its dependence on Hong Kong inevitable and much more so 
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than other countries which serve as hosts for direct Hong Kong 
investment. This also accounts to some extent for its shallow depth 
in industrialization. 
Role of Small and Medium Factories 
Since Macau manufacturing relies sigruficantly on Hong Kong, 
almost to the extent that it may be regarded as an overspill of Hong 
Kong industries, it is expected to share the other characteristics of 
Hong Kong style export-oriented industries, i.e. a system of 
activities dominated by small scale factories with market-oriented 
type of subcontracting emphasizing on price competitiveness, quick 
delivery and fle~ibility.'~ Detailed breakdown of manufacturing 
establishments in Macau according to size of employment is 
available only up to 1984. Even so, the summary report of the 
Xecenseamento Industrial 198429 provides only scant information. It 
just mentioned that 53% of the 1,167 industrial establishments 
reported in the survey employed less than 20 persons, and 28% 
employed below 5 persons. Official information later than 1984 
available is the list of industrial establishments in 1987. According 
to that list, out of 839 industrial establishments, 578, or 68.9%, 
employed 0-50 persons; 132 or 13.7% employed 50-100 persons, and 
129 or 15.4% employed 101 or more persons. Thus, more than eight 
out of ten of the listed factories in 1987 were small and medium size 
establishments. Of course, the 1987 list is by no means complete nor 
is it absolutely accurate. It is generally believed that there are 
around 1,000-5,000 household workshops that have not been 
included in the government's industrial censuses. We have, 
however, to leave the contention that there exists a large number of 
unreported petty factories aside and to turn to the only logical 
choice by following statistics revealed by industrial censuses of 
various dates, the earliest of which covers 1978 and the latest (with 
size-breakdown of the establishments) 1983. 
Table 6 shows the distribution of the size sectors in manufac- 
turing by numbers of establishments, employment, gross output 
value, and value-added in 1978-83. The number of establishments 
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Table 6. Significance of the Size Sector in the Manufacturing System of Macau, 197% 
1983 
1. Establishment (%) 
Total (absolute no.) (864) (1113) (1.118) (1,088) (1,155) (1,167) 
0-9 48.1 55.7 52.3 47.2 43.0 41.4 N.A. 
10-49 26.4 22.6 22.0 24.4 26.7 27.1 N.A. 
50-99 13.5 9.8 10.5 10.8 12.5 13.3 N.A. 
100-199 7.6 8.9 11.3 12.3 12.1 13.0 N.A. 
200-499 3.9 2.8 3.6 4.8 4.8 4.7 N.A. 
500 and over 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 N.A. 
2. Employment (%) 
Total (absolute (36,360)" (39,799) (46,962) (53,158) (59,306) (61,212) N.A. 
no. in persons) (31,426)b (45,212) (51,236) (59,336) (66,075) (67,103) N.A. 
0-9 5 2  5.5 4.7 3.6 3.1 1.9 N.A. 
10-49 14.7 15.1 12.7 11.4 12.0 11.7 N.A. 
50-99 23.5 19.7 18.1 15.5 17.3 17.5 N.A. 
100-199 25.4 33.7 36.1 34.6 31.9 33.4 N.A. 
500 and over 6.4 5.1 4.8 7.6 9.0 8.2 N.A. 
3. Gross output (%) 
Total (absolute 
million patacas) (1,360) (1,961) (2,751) (3,886) (4,943) (5,865) 
0-9 3.2 3.0 2.4 1.8 1.8 1.5 N.A. 
10-49 10.3 11.2 8.9 7.6 9.0 8.5 N.A. 
50-99 25.3 18.5 15.8 14.1 17.7 17.0 N.A. 
100-199 26.2 37.4 37.9 37.9 29.6 32.5 N.A. 
200-499 28.5 24.2 28.8 30.6 30.7 30.6 N.A. 
500 and over 6.4 5.8 6.2 8.0 11.2 9.9 N.A. 
4. Value-added (%)' 
Total (absolute 
million patacas) (371) (487) (645) (782) (987) (1,171) (1,732) 
0-9 5.2 4.7 4.2 2.8 2.9 2.3 NaA. 
10-49 13.4 14.4 112 8.8 10.0 9.2 N.A. 
50-99 25.5 18.8 17.4 12.8 13.2 14.9 N.A. 
100-199 23.2 35.2 35.9 31.1 26.7 25.9 N.A. 
200-499 26.0 22.1 27.7 24.5 26.2 26.7 N.A. 
500 and over 6.5 4.9 4.0 20.0 20.9 21.0 N.A. 
" Total worked from tables with size. Total reported by the census. 
' Worked out by deducting estimated non-manufacturing contribution from total 
industrial. An unknown number of firms might not have reported such values. 
Source: Compiled from Remseamento Industrial (various dates). 
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I 
I has shown little growth during 1978-84. In fact it remained almost 
1 stagnant at around 1,100 establishments since 1979. This is a very 
strange phenomenon, reflecting incomplete coverage as well as a 
1 
1 doubtful ground survey basis of the censuses, which nevertheless 
I 1 is difficult for us to further comment on. In spite of stagnation in the number of establishments, manufacturing registered steady progress in employment, peaking in 1983 when it recorded 67,103 
I persons. 1984 seemed a bad year as employment in manufacturing 
dipped to 59,001 persons. In terms of gross output, the record was 
more glamorous with a steady and rapid pace of increase from 
1,360 million patacas in 1978 to 5,865 million patacas in 1984, i.e. a 
331% increase. By value-added, the progress was equally spec- 
tacular with a 366% increase for the same period (1978-84). The 
decline of manufaduring employment in 1983-84 was strangely 
matched with substantial increases in gross output and value- 
added. However, this may be due partly to inflation and partly to 
some upward movement of the products in price and/or quality 
value. At this juncture, it is appropriate to point out that the 
industrial censuses have not returned gross output and value-added 
for all the reported establishments. The number of establishments 
that reported this information is less than complete, particularly for 
the very small ones employing less than five persons. Less than 50% 
of such small establishments returned data on gross output and 
value-added. Besides, the contribution by the various sized sectors 
to gross output and value-added in manufacturing have not been 
listed in all the census reports. Instead, there is only a list by size- 
breakdown for all industries, which includes manufaduring, mining 
and utilities. We have to estimate the amount contributed by the 
non-manufacturing sectors to produce the size breakdown for 
Table 6 concerning gross output, value-added and for productivity. 
If we define small as 0-99 persons, then 81.8% of Macau manu- 
facturing belong to the small category. Medium (100-499 persons) 
and large factories (500 and more persons) are few in number. In 
1983, they had respectively 17.7% and 0.4% of the total factory 
employees. So Macau factories are predominantly small, and SMI 
(Small and Medium Industries), by our definition, account for about 
99.6% of the total number of factories. 
In 1983, SMI accounted for close to 40,000 jobs, equivalent to 
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22.8% of the estimated total employment for 1985. The total 
employment provided by them exceeded the combined contribu- 
tions of construction, tourism, gambling, commerce, finance, fishing 
and farming and transport, storage and communication. This 
underlines the significance of labour-intensive manufacturing in 
Macau towards employment generation. Among SMI, the larger 
bulk of employment is concentrated within the size brackets of 50- 
199 persons i.e. the small-medium (Table 6). They contributed 50.9% 
of total manufacturing jobs in 1983. Petty firms employing less than 
10, though much more numerous in establishment number, are in 
fact not very significant in employment generation. They accounted 
only for 1.9% of total manufacturing employment (though as noted 
in Table 6, some of those factories might not have returned data on 
this). 
Measured by value of gross output, SMI achieved a share of 
90.1% of manufacturing total in 1983 (Table 6), much more sig- 
nificant than the larger industries. Again, the bulk of SMI contribu- 
tions was concentrated in the small-medium (50-199 persons) 
establishments which were responsible for as much as 49.5% of total 
manufacturing output. 
Measured by value-added, the contribution by SMI may be easily 
related to GDP, as value-added is an important basis for its 
calculation. If we use the share of total value-added by SMI in 
manufacturing in 1983 as a proxy for SMI's share in the proportion 
of GDP accounted for by manufacturing in 1984 (Table 2) then 
SMI's contribution to GDP in 1984 is estimated to be 29.1%. That 
amount is larger than the contribution by tourism (with gambling). 
SMI's economic role should therefore not be slighted. In fact, it may 
be said that modern industrialization in Macau has been the 
development of export-oriented small and medium industries and 
at present these industries have become the chief pillar in Macau 
both in terms of employment and GDP contribution. 
As a flexible form of industrial organization, SMI may be the 
better way for instantaneous response to the sudden market 
opportunities which have so much characterized Macau's post- 
World War 11 industrialization. The seasonal variations of demand 
for the dominant products such as knitwear, other garments, toys, 
etc. are easily observed. In the 1987 small and medium industry 
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I survey, it is reported that 48.1% of the factories received an order 
I 
I once or more than once a week, while 22.1% claimed that their 
I 
I orders are unstable. A high degree of flexibility and an ability of 
~ 
quick delivery to meet rush orders characterized small firms. 
Furthermore offering and receiving subcontracts among factories 
~ 
enhances the industrial division of labour making possible efficiency 
I in small size production. SMI may also be efficient, from the point 
of view of its utilization of labour at the skill level required by the 
majority of Macau's industries as they do not require skills of long 
periods from formal and on-the-job training. Small scale operation 
of individual firms therefore enhances the adaptability of Macau 
manufacturing to the outside demand situation and is also comple- 
mentary to the supply side considerations (other than labour) on 
which Hong Kong has much influence. 
Conclusion 
The special geo-political setting of Macau had generated, before 
World War 11, a peculiar economy based on the "special industries". 
Modernization and industrialization in the post-war period changed 
the basics of Macau's economy much, turning it into a growing 
centre for export-oriented light industries. However, the major 
factors for this new development still lie with Macau's peculiar geo- 
political situation. Nevertheless, Macau's small size, in both territory 
and population, and its low quality labour, a consequence of 
loneme neglect in technical and tertiary education, as well as its 
inadequate international communication and transport systems, 
have so conditioned it that manufacturing in present day Macau 
functions largely as an out-processing system, or in fact an adjunct 
of Hong Kong, depending heavily on the comparative advantages 
of cheap labour, quotas for major exports and preferential tariffs 
offered by the key markets under GPS. From this point of view, the 
nature of Macau manufacturing has been disadvantageously 
straight-jacketed in product range, and in market and technological 
range by the requirements of Hong Kong investors who dominate 
Macau manufacturing, making Macau's industries highly labour- 
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intensive, with low level of value-added and composed largely of 
small and medium sized establishments engaging mostly in simple 
assembling. 
By Macau's own standards, however, the growth of export- 
oriented industries may have been a great success, especially so 
when considering its rate of growth, quick response to market 
changes as reflected in shifts in market &d product concentration 
and its major contribution towards local employment and GDP. 
However, the process of growth has only taken the form largely of 
quantitative increase of goods manufactured, with little deepening 
in terms of technology and local entrepreneurship. This is one of the 
adverse consequences of over-dependence on Hong Kong which 
also undermined the otherwise, natural demand for building up 
Macau's own marketing and other industrial supporting capabilities. 
To a very large extent, industrialization in Macau has been driven 
by the domestic factor advantages of cheap labour and separate 
quota and tariff status, together with the cost-minimization 
motivations of Hong Kong's direct investment. In a way this is very 
close to a system of international subcontracting by multinational 
cooperations for the manufacture of low-cost parts and products for 
the international market which limits the possibility for the 
development of forward or backward linkages in the domestic 
economy of the host country. A good case has been described for 
the phi lip pine^,^" However, in the horizon new market forces and 
cheap labour havens in the vicinity of Macau are already making 
their impacts increasingly felt and threaten the future prospects of 
such type of industrialization. 
The open door policy of China has led to a much expanded 
possibility in the Pearl River Delta for the development of export- 
oriented light manufacturing. There are evidence that Hong Kong 
industrialists are already increasing their out-processing activities in 
the Delta. Macau's position as Hong Kong's out-processing area is 
thus under the very serious threat posted by the Pearl River Delta 
where land and labour are much cheaper. It has been estimated that 
by 1987, about one million persons had already been employed by 
joint-venture and processing establishments in the Delta which are 
mainly financed or based on processing orders from Hong Kong. 
With the coming of 1999 and the gradual integration of Macau and 
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I the Delta, the comparative edge of its cheap labour would diminish. 
I 
I At least one of its post-war driving forces in light manufacture, 
export-oriented industrialization would therefore phase out in 
E significance. On top of this, international protectionism, though still 
hitting directly at the Asian NICs, is gradually affecting Macau 
I 
exports as well. How should Macau face such new challenges? In 
I addition, within Macau itself, the key factor of production - labour - 
I is increasingly short in supply and hence also becoming expensive. 
There are suggestions by the local industrial community to upgrade 
technology and to improve labour skill. Could these work in Macau, 
if the nature of Macau manufacturing remains unchanged? These 
are important questions which would seriously affect the health and 
well-being of its entire manufacturing economy and perhaps also of 
its prospects in the foreseeable future. 
The purpose of this paper may serve to present the general 
background through the qualitative account of Macau's post-war 
industrial growth. Further insights into the nature and prospects of 
Macau's industrialization and an attempt to answer the above 
questions would require further research. 
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